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斯坦福大學 哲學終身教授

分類:背景提升 發布日期:2022-05-25 發布人:溈徠

HS2020122

斯坦福大學

哲學終身教授

Professor of Philosophy Emeritus

 

 斯坦福大學 哲學終身教授(圖1)該教授是斯坦福大學哲學終身教授. 他在語言哲學,形而上學和心靈哲學領域為哲學做出了重大貢獻。他以在情境語義,反身性,索引性,個人身份和自我知識方面的工作而聞名。

1978 年的著作 A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality 通過對話的方式探討個人身份理論中的標準問題, 其形式在對話中將不同的哲學立場與不同的人物聯系起來, David Hume  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 相似。


1v1 科研

 

結合八年來在美國頂級名校的深耕布局,ASC 在全美國擁有超 500 位常春藤盟校及行業頂尖排位的終身教授的人才庫。針對全球學生在各科系、各院校、各時間段的需求點,做到無縫對接,按照學生的具體要求,量身定制符合學生特色需求的科研項目,真正實現興趣與大師的完美契合。

 

ASC 名師一對一并非傳統的授課模式,而是由教授根據學生的科研興趣點,量身定制一個屬于學生自己的獨立科研課題,并且通過 1 次的試探性閱讀與交流,確立學生的科研興趣點,再通過 1-2 次的研討,確立科研的論題,2 次的研討確立論題的論據,最后產出科研論文。這個過程中,學生與教授會實現無縫溝通,由教授直接給學生布置相關科研內容的課題閱讀,幫助學生進一步深化他對科研內容的理解。

 

ASC 名師一對一是目前全球唯一由美國頂級名校終身教授全程親自執教帶領,以激發學生主動性科研,實現完全由學生自發完成的獨立科研課題項目。

 

時間:任意時間段,滾動開班

· 根據學生情況任意安排,線上科研

· 總直播授課時間為 15 小時。

· 由教授授課總時間為 5 小時,五周完成。

· 每周授課 1 小時。授課中,教授主要講解科研的方法與學科切入的重點,布置相應的閱讀,促進學生思考,由學生下課后進行獨立研究探索。

· 由哥倫比亞大學寫作教授組織超小型論文輔導課為 10 小時。

· 預計學生所花費的獨立科研總時長:45 小時。

· 教授與學生一對一聯系,進度由教授直接把控。

· 同時配備一個學習顧問全程安排學習工作與論文產出進度。

 

產出:

教授根據學生科研項目出具量身定制版本的推薦信。

學術論文,可定制學術期刊發表。


Research Interests

He has made contributions to many areas of philosophy, including logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. His 1978 book A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality deals with standard problems in the theory of personal identity in the form of a dialogue between a mortally wounded university professor, Gretchen Weirob, and her two friends, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen. The views represented include those of Bernard Williams, John Locke, and Derek Parfit. The format of associating different philosophical positions with different characters in a dialogue recalls David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

In 1979, he published "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" in which he combined his work on philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Essential indexicals (I, here, and now) are parts of language that cannot be paraphrased away. They are seen as locating beliefs and are essential to understand the speaker's belief.

 Areas of Expertise

Philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind

Topics Covered 'Borges and I' and 'I'

In Jorge Luis Borges’ (very) short story, “Borges and I,” one character, referred to in the first person, complains about his strained and complex relation with another character, called “Borges.” But the characters are both presumably the author of the short story. This study tries to use ideas from the philosophy of language to explain how Borges uses language to express complex thoughts, and then discusses two interpretations of the story.

 Moore’s Paradox

G. E. Moore famously noted that saying ‘I went to the movies, but I don't believe it’ is absurd, while saying ‘I went to the movies, but he doesn't believe it’ is not in the least absurd. The problem is to explain this fact without supposing that the semantic contribution of ‘believes’ changes across first- person and third-person uses, and without making the absurdity out to be merely pragmatic. We offer a new solution to the paradox. Our solution is that the truth conditions of any moorean utterance contradict its accuracy conditions. Thus we diagnose a contradiction in how the moorean utterance represents things as being; so we can do justice to the intuition that a Moore-paradoxical utterance is in some way senseless, even if we know what proposition it expresses.

 Squaring the Circle

Making the distinction between semantics and pragmatics has proven to be a tricky task, leading to several problems that look like Gordian knots, or worse; perhaps semantics and pragmatics are so tangled that separating them is impossible, like squaring the circle. In a nutshell, pragmatic inference both requires and is required by the determination of what is said. Thus, there is no way


to unravel semantics and pragmatics. In this paper, we will show how to square Grice’s circle. We untie the semantics/pragmatics knot, without using any of Alexander’s methods: slicing it with a sword or removing the (semantic) pin around which it was bound. The approach consists in assuming a minimal but truth-conditionally complete notion of semantic content, which doesn’t constitute what is said by the utterance, but does provide the required input for pragmatic reasoning.


 Selected Publications:

Books

1978. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

1983. Situations and Attitudes. With J. Barwise. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

1993. The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays_. New York: Oxford University Press. (Enlarged edition, Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2000.)

1999. Problems d'Indexicalité_. Selected essays translated by J. Dokic and F. Preisig. Stanford and Paris: Editions CSLI: 1999.

1999. Dialogue on Good, Evil and the Existence of God_. Cambridge/Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

2001. Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness_. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

2001. Reference and Reflexivity_. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 2nd edition, 2011.

2002. Identity, Personal Identity and the Self_. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Articles

2009. Diminished and Fractured Selves. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok and Peter V. Rabins (Editors) Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

2009. Subjectivity. In Brian P. McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press: 223-238.

2009. Directing Intentions. In Joseph Almog and Paulo Leonardi (eds), _ The Philosophy of David Kaplan_. Oxford University Press, 2009:187-202.

2009. Hintikka on Demonstratives, Revue internationale de philosophie 4 (2009) , 250: p. 369-

3821

2009. Hume and Frege on Identity. (Book Symposium on Donald Baxter, Hume’s Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise.) Philosophical Studies, 146: 413-423.

2010. What is Said. Recanati, Stojanovic and Villanueva (eds), Context Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton-DeGruyter. (With Kepa Korta)

2010. Velleman: Self to Self. Nous, 44:4:1-19.

2010. Persons and Selves. In Béatrice Longuesness, editor, Le Moi/The Self/Le Soi, special number of Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, October-December 2010 No. 4.


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